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Closing a Parol Evidence Rule Loophole: The
Consideration Exception and the Preexisting Duty Rule

Daniel P. O'Gorman 1
The parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule are two classic
contract-law doctrines. The parol evidence rule gives primacy to a written
document over prior negotiations and agreements, and the preexisting duty
rule provides that a promise to perform, or the performance of, a legal duty is
not consideration. The former doctrine deals with the contract's content and the
latter doctrine deals with the agreement's enforceability. One might therefore
expect that the two would operate in their own corners of contract law without
conflict.
Yet an exception to the parol evidence rule permits a party to rely on
extrinsic evidence to show that a written agreement is not legally binding
because it is not supported by consideration. If a party seeks to show that a
written agreement was infact a modification of a prior oral contract, and
that the written agreement is not binding because it lacks consideration under
the preexisting duty rule, the two rules come into conflict and one must give
way. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that the parol evidence
rule should give way, and that position has been followed by some courts. Yet
such an exception to the parol evidence rule threatens to undermine the rule's
evidentiary function, which is based on the belief that written evidence is more
reliable than oral evidence, and its gatekeeping function, which is based on a
distrust of the jury. Accordingly, an accommodation between the two doctrines
is necessary to avoid undermining the parol evidence rule's purposes.
This Article maintains that the consideration exception should not apply
in a case involving a written agreement that a party asserts is an unenforceable
modification under the preexisting duty rule, as long as the opposing party
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introduces sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the prior
agreement's existence. Such an approach will preserve the parol evidence rule's
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions.
Introduction

The parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule are two
titans of classical contract law. The parol evidence rule gives primacy
to a written document (a so-called integrated agreement) over prior
and contemporaneous agreements and negotiations not included
in the integrated agreement. 2 The preexisting duty rule provides
that a promise to perform, or the performance of, a legal duty is
not consideration. 3 The former doctrine deals with the contract's
content4 and the latter with an agreement's enforceability. 5 Because
the doctrines deal with distinct subject matters, one might expect the
two would peacefully operate in their own corners of contract law.
Yet an exception to the parol evidence rule permits a party to
rely on extrinsic evidence to show that an integrated agreement is
not binding because it is not supported by consideration. 6 Thus, if a
plaintiff seeks to show that an integrated agreement was a modification
of a prior oral contract, and that the integrated agreement is not
binding because it lacks consideration under the preexisting duty rule,
the two doctrines come into conflict and one must give way.
For example, assume that the plaintiff and the defendant
entered into a written contract under which the defendant promised
to build a toolshed for the plaintiff and in exchange the plaintiff

2

3
4

5

6

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) ("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements
to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. A binding completely integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its
scope.").
See id. § 73 ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither
doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration ....").
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 107 (6th
ed. 2009) (noting that the parol evidence rule determines "the content of the
contract.").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (noting that the preexisting duty rule results in the denial of enforcement
to promises that would otherwise be valid).
See id. § 214 (d) ("Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous
with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... lack
of consideration ....").
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promised to pay the defendant a specified amount of money. After the
defendant builds the toolshed the plaintiff demands that the defendant
also paint the toolshed at no extra cost to the plaintiff, alleging that
the parties orally agreed prior to reducing their agreement to writing
that the deal included the paint job. The defendant refuses, denying
the existence of any such oral agreement. The plaintiff therefore sues
the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argues that the
oral agreement never existed and that, even if it did, the failure to
incorporate it into the written contract discharges it under the parol
evidence rule. In response, the plaintiff argues that he is seeking to
introduce the prior oral agreement to show that the written contract
was in fact a modification of a prior oral agreement that included the
paint job, and that the subsequent written contract lacks consideration
under the preexisting duty rule because no new consideration was
provided to the plaintiff for the deletion of the defendant's duty to
paint the toolshed.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that in such a
situation the parol evidence rule should give way to the preexisting duty
rule and evidence of the prior oral agreement should be admissible, 7 a
position followed by some courts. 8 Yet such an exception to the parol
evidence rule threatens to undermine the rule's evidentiary function,
which is based on the belief that written evidence is more reliable
than oral evidence, 9 and its gatekeeping function, which is based on

7

8

9

See id. § 214 cmt. c, illus. 5 ("A and B make an integrated agreement by which
A promises to complete an unfinished building according to certain plans and
specifications, and B promises to pay A $2,000 for so doing. It may be shown
that, by a contract made previously with B, A had promised to erect and
complete the building for $10,000; that he had not fully completed it though
paid the whole price. This evidence is admissible to show that there is no
consideration for B's new promise, since A is promising no more than he is
bound by his original contract to perform.").
See Audubon Indem. Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc., 358 S.W.3d 309, 316-18
(Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to determine
whether a written agreement that differed from a prior oral agreement was a
modification that lacked consideration under the preexisting duty rule); Guar.
Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 222 F.2d 416, 420-21 (3d
Cir. 1955) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to show that a written
agreement that was an attempted modification of a prior agreement lacked
consideration under the preexisting duty rule).
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1778 (1976) ("The evidentiary function includes both providing
good evidence of the existence of a transaction and providing good evidence of
the legal consequences the parties intended should follow."); Joseph M. Perillo,
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a distrust of the jury. 10 Accordingly, an accommodation between the
parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule is necessary to avoid
undermining the parol evidence rule's purposes.
This Article maintains that the parol evidence rule's
consideration exception should not apply in a case involving a written
agreement that a party asserts is an unenforceable modification under
the preexisting duty rule, provided the opposing party introduces
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the prior
agreement's existence. Such an approach preserves the parol evidence
rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions.
Part I of this Article provides a background of the parol
evidence rule. Part II provides a background of the preexisting duty
rule. Part III discusses how the parol evidence rule's consideration
exception applies with respect to the preexisting duty rule, and
why it is a parol evidence rule loophole. Part IV provides a test to
accommodate the parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule,
thereby closing the loophole. Part V is a brief conclusion.
I. The Parol Evidence Rule
A. The Contours of the Parol Evidence Rule

The parol evidence rule provides that an integrated agreement
usually supersedes prior and contemporaneous promises and
agreements that were not incorporated into the integrated agreement. 11
Specifically, the rule provides that "[a] binding integrated agreement
discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with
them" and "[a] binding completely integrated agreement discharges

Statute of Frauds in Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 39, 64 (1974) (noting that the purpose of the evidentiary function is

to "supply and preserve evidence of the contract.").
10

11

See Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control
of the jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 366 (1932) (arguing that the parol evidence rule

is based on a distrust of the jury).
note 4, at 107; see also Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule,
53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944) ("When two parties have made a contract and
have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete
and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise,
of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the
purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. This is in substance what is
called the 'parol evidence rule' .... ").
PERILLO, supra
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prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope." 12
Despite its name, the rule is not considered a rule of evidence but
a rule of substantive law, in that it determines contract rights and
duties. 13
For the parol evidence rule to apply the parties must
have manifested assent to a binding integrated agreement. 14 The
manifestation of assent need not take any particular form, such as
signing the document, and can include an oral manifestation or even
assent by silence. 15 But if either of the parties fails to manifest assent
to the document, there is no integrated agreement and the parol
evidence rule does not apply. 16 Also, under the so-called conditionaldelivery exception, where the parties to a written document agree
orally that it is not effective unless and until a particular condition
occurs, the document is not a binding integrated agreement until
such condition occurs. 17
12
13

14

15

16

17

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
Id.§ 213 cmt. a. But see Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the CommonLaw?Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on judicial Practice and the Law's
Subsequent Development, 1994 Wrs. L. REV. 1119, 1244 n.473 ("These (and
other) legalists' views [that the parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence]
may be attributable to their having viewed the contemporary evidentiary
regime-which favored liberal admission of evidence-as the only possible
approach to evidence law. For example, Williston appears to justify his claim
that the parol evidence rule is a matter of substantive law on the basis that 'it
defines the limits of a contract; it fixes the subject matter for interpretation,
though not itself a rule of interpretation.' That, of course, is exactly what a rule
of evidence does: it determines what material is to be subject to the factfinder's
interpretation.") (citation omitted).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
see also id. cmts. b & c (noting that the court must make the preliminary
determination that there is an integrated agreement); PERILLO, supra note
4, at 112 ("The first issue in a parol evidence problem is whether the parties
intended the writing to be a final embodiment of their agreement in whole or
in part.").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) ("The intention of the parties may ... be manifested without
explicit statement and without signature. A letter, telegram or other informal
document written by one party may be orally assented to by the other as a final
expression of some or all of the terms of their agreement."); id. cmt. b, illus.
2 (providing an example of manifesting assent through silence).
See id. cmt. b, illus. 1 (providing illustration where the parties reduce their oral
agreement to written form but the parties are not satisfied with the document
and agree to have it redrafted).
Id.§217.
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An integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting
a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." 18 Thus,
the parol evidence rule only applies when the last expression of
the parties' agreement is written. 19 An integrated agreement need
not, however, take any particular written form; 20 it can even be
a written confirmation of the agreement. 21 Also, it need not be a
complete statement of the parties' deal. 22 But a document intended
to be tentative and preliminary to a final draft is not an integrated
agreement. 23 Whether a document has been adopted as an integrated
agreement is decided by the judge, not the jury, even though it is an
issue of fact. 24
Because the parol evidence rule does not apply unless the
integrated agreement is binding, an integrated agreement does
not supersede a prior agreement if the integrated agreement
lacks consideration or is voidable and has been avoided. 25 Thus,
"[a]greements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... lack
of consideration [for the writing] ." 26 For example, a majority of courts
permit extrinsic evidence to show that a recital that consideration has
been provided is false. 27 Also, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27

Id.§ 209(1). John Henry Wigmore apparently coined the term "integration."
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME EDITION 535
(1952).
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 107. An integrated agreement that is a confirmation
of a prior oral agreement is considered a modification of the prior agreement.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("No particular form is required for an integrated agreement.").
Id. cmt. b, illus. 2.
Id.§210(2).
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 112.
Id. at 112-13.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(3), cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
Id. § 214(d); see also PERILLO, supra note 4, at 126 ("It is frequently said
that the parol evidence rule does not preclude the showing of an absence of
consideration.").
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 126-27; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 218(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A recital of a fact in an
integrated agreement may be shown to be untrue."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 429 (4th ed. 2004) ("Even if a completely integrated agreement
recites that consideration was given, it may be shown that the recital is
untrue.").
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that the only promise made by one of the parties was not intended
by the parties to be performed, and thus the purported bargain is
a sham. 28 The rationale for the exception for invalidating causes is
that the parol evidence rule does not apply unless the integrated
agreement is binding, and invalidating causes commonly do not
appear on the document's face. 29
If the parties manifest assent to a binding integrated
agreement, the next question is whether the integrated agreement
discharges the prior or contemporaneous agreement that a party is
seeking to enforce. 30 The parol evidence rule is misnamed in the
sense that under the rule an integrated agreement can supersede prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements. 31 The rule does

28
29

30
31

PERILLO, supra note 4, at 127.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 214 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1981). Interestingly, requiring that an integrated agreement be binding for the
common-law parol evidence rule to apply results in a softer parol evidence rule
for cases governed by the common law than for cases governed by Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The U.C.C.'s parol evidence rule
does not include a requirement that the integrated agreement be binding. See
u.c.c. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012). Rather, the
rule applies to" [t]erms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement ...." Id. Under the U.C.C., all
that is necessary is a finding that "the writing was intended by both parties as
a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms." Id. cmt. 3. And even if a
requirement of a "binding" agreement could be supplied through the U.C.C.
provision incorporating common-law rules, U.C.C. § 1-103, under the U.C.C.
a modification does not need consideration to be binding, U.C.C. § 2-209(1),
as long as it meets the test of good faith. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2.
Thus, if the transaction involves the sale of goods and is therefore governed
by Article 2 of the U.C.C., see id. § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise
requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods ...."),the consideration
exception would not prevent the parol evidence rule from having the effect
of superseding the prior promise or agreement, unless perhaps it could be
shown that the integrated agreement was prepared in bad faith by one of the
parties. If the parties form an oral contract and one of the parties sends a signed,
written confirmation to the other that includes additional or different terms,
but the other does not manifest assent to the written confirmation, whether
the additional or different terms supersede the prior oral agreement would be
determined by U.C.C. § 2-207(2), not the parol evidence rule. See id. § 2-207 (2).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
See id. cmt. a.
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not, however, discharge agreements subsequent to the integrated
agreement, even if they are oral. 32
If the binding integrated agreement contradicts the prior
agreement, the prior agreement is discharged, 33 even if the integrated
agreement does not contain all of the terms of the parties' agreement
(a so-called partial integration) .34 If the integrated agreement does
not contradict the prior agreement, the prior agreement is still
discharged if it was not agreed to for separate consideration and
under the circumstances it would have been natural to include it in
the integrated agreement. 35 If the prior agreement was agreed to for
separate consideration or under the circumstances it was natural to
omit it from the integrated agreement, the prior agreement is not
discharged under the parol evidence rule and the integrated agreement
is necessarily a partial integration and not a total integration. 36 In
such a situation, the naturally-omitted agreement is often called
a "collateral" agreement. 37 The natural-inclusion test is applied by

32

33
34
35

36
37

See PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116. Of course, such an attempted modification

might be unenforceable for other reasons, such as a lack of consideration or
as contrary to a no-oral-modification clause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. cmt. b.
See id.§ 216(2); see also PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116 ("Williston's ... rule
states that when a term not found in the writing is offered into evidence by one
of the parties and it would have been natural for the parties to have excluded
that term from the writing, there is a partial integration with respect to that
term; the term may be admitted into evidence if it does not contradict the
writing.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 216(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
McCormick, supra note 10, at 3 71. The idea of a collateral agreement not being
discharged by a subsequent, integrated agreement gave rise to the so-called
collateral-agreement test, but whether a prior agreement is collateral to
the integrated agreement is simply a conclusion reached after applying the
natural-inclusion test, and not itself a test. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 434 (5th ed. 2011) ("[T]o determine whether a
particular extrinsic agreement was a collateral agreement, it is necessary to
determine whether the parties ordinarily (naturally and normally) include such
[an agreement] in the particular writing expressing their agreement .... If,
however, they would not have naturally included such a matter in the writing,
the extrinsic agreement is called 'collateral' and the evidence is admitted ....
[Thus], the question of admissibility is determined by the 'natural omission'
test and not by the label attached to the extrinsic agreement .... The so-called
'collateral agreement' test is not a test; it is a superfluous conclusory label
attached after the critical natural omission test has been applied and the court
has already determined whether the evidence should be admitted.").
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the court. 38 But if the parol evidence rule does not discharge the
prior agreement, whether the prior agreement was actually made is
an issue for the fact-finder. 39 With respect to the natural-inclusion
test (also called the natural-omission test), there is disagreement as
to whether an objective test (i.e., what reasonable parties similarly
situated would have done) or a subjective test (i.e., what the parties
actually intended) should be applied to determine if it would have been
natural to include the prior agreement in the integrated agreement. 40
B. Rationales for the Parol Evidence Rule

Three different rationales have been provided for the parol
evidence rule: an evidentiary function; a gatekeeping function; and
a merger (or integration) function. Which of these can legitimately
claim to be a basis for the rule is critical to determining whether the
consideration exception undermines any of the parol evidence rule's
purposes. Accordingly, each of the rationales is discussed below.
1. Evidentiary Function

One rationale, popularized by Professor Charles T.
McCormick, 41 is that, like the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence

38

39
40

41

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(3) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("Whether an agreement is completely or partially integrated is to be
determined by the court .... ").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
See PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116 (stating that under Williston's test, "[t]he
question of whether it was natural to exclude the proffered term is answered
by the court's conclusion of what reasonable parties similarly situated would
naturally do with respect to the term. Williston's rule was adopted by the First
Restatement and became and probably still is the majority approach . . . .
Corbin rejects Williston's 'reasonable person' approach and is determined to
search out the actual intention of the parties. The issue for Corbin is whether
the parties actually agreed or intended that the writing was a total and
complete statement of their agreement .... It is clear that Corbin's approach
undercuts the traditional parol evidence rule .... The trend is now in Corbin's
direction and will be accelerated by the Restatement (Second) which ... has
staked out a position similar to Corbin's."); see also McCormick, supra note 10,
at 379 (stating that the natural-inclusion test is "aimed at abstract impersonal
probabilities.").
Professor McCormick was a prominent evidence scholar in the mid-twentieth
century. THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 370
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rule performs an evidentiary function in that a written document is
more reliable evidence of an agreement's terms than oral testimony. 42
As Professor E. Allan Farnsworth acknowledged, parties reduce their
agreements to written form "to provide trustworthy evidence of the
fact and terms of their agreement and to avoid reliance on uncertain
memory." 43 Presumably, parties do not reduce their agreement to
writing to simply supersede prior agreements. Under the evidentiary
rationale, the parol evidence is more akin to a rule of evidence than
a rule of substantive law.
Subsequent contract-law scholars have echoed McCormick's
argument. As stated by Professor Joseph M. Perillo, "[t]he policy
behind the rule is to give the writing a preferred status so as to render
it immune to perjured testimony and the risk of 'uncertain testimony
of slippery memory."' 44 Chancellor John Edward Murray, Jr., noted,
"[s]ince memories of oral understandings are fallible and subject to
favorable or unfavorable (conscious or unconscious) recollection, the
recorded evidence of the parties' intention as a permanent record of
their intention not subject to the vagaries of memory should prevail." 45
And the Restatement (Second) of Contracts seemingly acknowledges
the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function: "The parties to an
agreement often reduce all or part of it to writing ... to provide
reliable evidence of its making and its terms and to avoid trusting
to uncertain memory.... In the interest of certainty and security of
transactions, the law gives special effect to a writing .... " 46
(Roger K. Newman ed. 2009).
42

43
44
45

46

See McCormick, supra note 10; see also David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of
Industry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation, 57 SMU L. REV. 387, 469

(2004) ("Professor McCormick popularized the 'evidentiary' rationale for the
parol evidence rule ...."').
FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 415.
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109 (quoting McCormick, supra note 10, at 366-67
&n.3).
MURRAY, supra note 3 7, at 418; see also JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING
CONTRACTS 335 (2d ed. 2009) ("Preventing the parties from introducing
evidence beyond the terms of the written contract limits the parties'
opportunities to commit perjury. It also avoids the necessity of depending on
fading and variable memories of the negotiations that led to the creation of the
contract. Even scrupulously honest people have an uncanny ability to perceive
events in a manner likely to serve their own interests.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 9, topic 3, intro. note (AM.
LAW INST. 1981). See also Michael L. Closen & Charles N. Faerber, The Case
That There Is A Common Law Duty of Notaries Public to Create and Preserve Detailed
journal Records of Their Official Acts, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231, 257-58 (2009)
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McCormick acknowledged that the conditional-delivery
exception to the parol evidence rule and the rule's inapplicability
to an alleged subsequent oral modification weakened the argument
that the rule has an evidentiary function, but he did not believe it
eliminated it. 47 He argued that "[e]ach of these escapes from the
writing presents difficulties to the one who attempts it, and, in any
event, the fact that protection in some situations has not been perfect,
does not disprove the desire to furnish it generally." 48
But for the parol evidence rule to perform an evidentiary
function it must add to existing protections against unreliable
evidence. For example, even without a parol evidence rule, "judges
and juries have generally given greater weight to visual evidence
(in the form of both writings and exhibits) than to oral evidence." 49
As one commentator has explained:
People are fascinated by the real thing. The bullets
that were found lodged in the victim's heart, the actual
handwritten memorandum that was used to seal the
agreement, the remains of the automobile gas tank that
ruptured on impact burning the occupants of the car.

47
48
49

("The legal preference for evidence in the form of a writing over mere oral
history or testimony is so well established that it rises to the level of a general
standard of conduct. It is simply well founded in human experience that written
instruments generated contemporaneously with an event (that is not subject
to dispute until later) are more likely to be trusted than subsequent orally
described recollections of the event, as the former represent fresh, unchanged
and accurate impressions while the latter are subject to the vagaries of human
memory. This attitude is reflected in a number of the law's earliest and longestenduring evidentiary and substantive rules, including ... the parol evidence
rule .... "); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 51, 122 (1987) ("It seems unlikely ... that the [parol evidence] rule
is completely untarnished by the desire to exclude unreliable testimony. While
there are other reasons for giving primacy to written agreements, the rule is at
least partly based upon the danger that jurors will overvalue testimony about
oral agreements."); Note, Some Suggested Reforms in the Application of the Paro!
Evidence Rule to Insurance Contracts, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1017 (1934) ("One
of the most important practical purposes of the parol evidence rule is to ...
prevent proof of a contract by untrustworthy testimony.").
McCormick, supra note 10, at 368 n.6.

Id.
Bernard ]. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 241
(1994).
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... Until we see something tangible, [the event] is
something that did not happen, or at least did not
happen to real people .... so
A judge could even instruct the jury regarding the weight to be given
to different forms of evidence to help ensure that the jury does not
give undue weight to oral testimony compared to written evidence.
How then does the parol evidence rule serve an evidentiary
function in a way different from the typical fact-finder's distrust of
oral testimony compared to written evidence? For those who view
the parol evidence rule as serving an evidentiary function, it does so
by operating as a legal formality.s 1 When conducting a parol evidence
rule analysis, the court assumes that the prior agreement was made,
and then determines whether the prior agreement is inconsistent with
the integrated agreement or whether it would have been natural to
include the prior agreement in the integrated agreement.s 2 If the prior
agreement is either inconsistent with the integrated agreement or it
would have been natural to include it in the integrated agreement, a
conclusive presumption arises that, contrary to the testimony of the
proponent of the evidence, the prior agreement either never occurred
as alleged or that the parties did not intend it to survive the integrated
agreement (the proponent's testimony to the contrary being either
perjured, based on faulty memory, or an unreasonable interpretation
of what transpired). s3
The parol evidence rule test has the characteristics of a
legal formality because it does not ask directly whether the prior

50

ASHLEY S. LIPSON, ART OF ADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE §

51

See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1691 (referring to the parol evidence rule as a
legal formality); see also Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and
CompoundRule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726, 1743 (2008) ("A legal formality is a type

2.02 (1994).

52
53

of act, such as the utterance of special words or the production of a document
in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance.").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
See McCormick, supra note 10, at 369 (noting that the parol evidence rule is a
device that used a formula to determine whether an agreement "is 'conclusively
presumed' to embody the whole agreement").
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agreement existed (in fact it is assumed for purposes of the test that
it did occur) or whether the parties intended it to be discharged by
not including it in the integrated agreement. Rather, provided that
an objective standard is applied, the natural-inclusion test is used as
a proxy for determining whether the prior agreement existed or, if
it did, whether the parties intended it to be superseded. This test is
necessarily over-inclusive in that it will discharge some agreements
that did exist and that were not intended to be superseded. (It will
never be under-inclusive because it only discharges promises and
agreements.) Accordingly, the prior agreement must pass an overinclusive, preliminary credibility test before the issue of whether the
agreement in fact existed and, if so, whether it was intended to be
superseded by the integrated agreement, is submitted to the factfinder for determination. As noted by McCormick, the parol evidence
rule "enables the judge to head off the difficulty [of whether the
prior agreement existed and, if so, whether the parties intended it
to be superseded by the integrated agreement] at its source, not by
professing to decide any question as to the credibility of the asserted
oral variation, but by professing to exclude the evidence ... altogether
because forbidden by a mysterious legal ban." 54
If the objective standard essentially implements the
reasonably-careful-person standard of negligence law, 55 the reasonablycareful person would usually incorporate prior agreements into an
integrated agreement to ensure there was no dispute as to whether
the agreement existed or whether it was superseded. Note that the
reasonably-careful person "is not to be identified with any ordinary
individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a
prudent and careful person, who is always up to standard." 56 If one
applied the Hand formula to determine how a reasonably-careful

54
55

56

Id.
Under tort law, "[a] person acts negligently if the person does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2010). And "because a 'reasonably careful person' (or a 'reasonably prudent
person') is one who acts with reasonable care, the 'reasonable care' standard
for negligence [in tort law] is basically the same standard expressed in terms
of the 'reasonably careful person' (or the 'reasonably prudent person')." Id. §
3 cmt. a.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984).
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person would behave under the circumstances, 57 the low cost of
taking adequate precautions (ensuring that the agreement is included
in the integrated agreement) would result in the parol evidence rule
discharging many agreements that in fact existed and that were not
intended to be superseded. 58
The parol evidence rule operating as a legal formality was
recognized by Professor Duncan Kennedy, who characterized it as a
legal formality that "operate[s] through the contradiction of private
intentions." 59 Like other formalities, it "means that unless the parties
adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be
ignored" (what he termed the "sanction of nullity") .60 Thus, if the
parties fail to reduce a portion of their oral agreement to written
form, yet reduce other portions to written form, the parol evidence
rule might discharge those prior agreements even if such a result is
contrary to the parties' intentions.
Interestingly, the parol evidence rule applies the same test
as a proxy for answering two different questions: whether the prior
agreement existed and, if it did, whether the parties intended to
supersede it with the integrated agreement. But the contradiction
and the natural-inclusion tests do an acceptable job of addressing
both questions. If the prior agreement is contradicted by the
integrated agreement or it would have been natural to include the
prior agreement in the integrated agreement, there is reason to doubt
both the agreement's existence and whether the parties intended it
to survive the integrated agreement.
That the parol evidence rule performs the evidentiary function
of form does not, however, answer the question of why such a legal
formality is necessary. Why not simply decide whether the prior
agreement existed and, if so, whether the parties intended it to be
discharged by the subsequent agreement, particularly if fact-finders
tend to favor tangible evidence? As noted by Professor Eric A. Posner,

57

58
59
60

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand,
J.) (setting forth a formula for determining whether a person's conduct fell
below the appropriate standard of care for purposes of determining negligence
liability in tort).
See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Contract Law and the Hand Formula, 75 LA. L. REV. 127,
156 (2014) (discussing the Hand formula).
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1691.
Id. at 1692.
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a court could simply "[a]dmit extrinsic evidence, weigh it against the
writing, and make an all-things-considered judgment." 61
The reason for the parol evidence rule to be cast as a legal
formality is because the type of factual determinations involved are
considered particularly subject to error. As noted by Professor Posner:
[NJ egotiations that lead up to writings often involve
give-and-take and take-back. A party might offer a
particular term X and then retract it when it appears
that the other party will not reciprocate by offering a
term that the first party seeks. Courts that go back and
look at the record of negotiations-often relying on the
parties' fallible memories-might mistakenly believe
that term X was agreed to as part of the contract. The
parol evidence rule ... reflects doubts about judicial
ability to understand the record of the negotiations. 62
In fact, parties presumably reduce their agreements to writing to
avoid unpredictable fact-finding by a court or jury.
But the cure might be worse than the disease. After all, legal
formalities result in determinations contrary to the parties' intentions,
and thus the question arises as to why it is better to err on the side of
under-enforcement of prior agreements rather than over-enforcement.
Why is it worse to enforce agreements that never existed than to not
enforce agreements that did? Either way there will be an error rate.
Also, the test likely results in an error rate in favor of sophisticated
parties, who are more likely to know about the parol evidence rule.
The answer is that the parol evidence rule's purpose of
avoiding erroneous findings that an agreement had been made is
considered essential to the stability of contracts, particularly business
contracts, enabling parties to more accurately determine their rights
and duties. As stated by one court:
Without the rule there would be no assurance of the
enforceability of the written contract. If such assurance
were removed today from our law, general disaster
would result, because of the consequent destruction

61
62

ERIC

Id.

A.

POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY

146 (2011).
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of confidence, for the tremendous but closely adjusted
machinery of modern business cannot function at all
without confidence in the enforceability of contracts. 63
As stated by Professor Perillo, "[t]he objective is to secure business
stability." 64 These benefits were further explained by a commentator
as follows with respect to increasing the predictability of outcomes
in lawsuits:
[C]onsider the parol evidence rule, a doctrine usually
conceived as part of contract, but which, at its core,
is an evidentiary rule incorporating an approach ...
which quells fighting among the parties .... By favoring
documentary evidence over testimony and limiting
the scope of the jury's fact-finding responsibility,
the rule eliminates considerable fighting among the
parties and ousts any need for cross-examination over
particularly fractious matters. Also, by making more
certain the factual record with which both parties will
have to work at trial, the rule eliminates the possibility
that each party will interpret factual ambiguities in
its favor while constructing his litigation strategy.
This diminution in uncertainty, which cuts against
advocates' tendencies to overestimate the strength of
their cases, is an important inducement to settlement. 65
As stated by the New York Court of Appeals in the well-known case
of Mitchill v. Lath, "[n] otwithstanding injustice here and there, on the
whole it works for good." 66
Also, the idea is that once a legal formality becomes well
known, parties will use it and the instances of injustice caused by the
formality's over-inclusiveness will be reduced. Legal formalities thus
perform a "channeling function," encouraging parties to adopt the
required form. 67 For example, Professor Kennedy noted that the reason
for ignoring the parties' wishes when applying a legal formality "is to

63
64
65
66
67

Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Smartwood, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (Minn. 1924).
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109.
Rosen, supra note 13, at 1244-46.
Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928).
Lon L. Fuller, ConsiderationandForm, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941).
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force them to be self conscious and to express themselves clearly, not
to influence the substantive choice about ... what to contract for." 68
Formalities "are supposed to help parties in communicating clearly
to the judge which of various alternatives they want him to follow
in dealing with disputes that may arise later in their relationship." 69
Thus, all that parties need to do is incorporate their prior agreements
into the integrated agreement, thereby communicating clearly to the
judge that the agreement exists and that they intend for it to remain
effective. Therefore, although the parol evidence rule, like the Statute
of Frauds, causes erroneous determinations in some cases, the hope
is that the overall error rate will be reduced as parties learn to include
their entire agreement in the integrated agreement.
The parol evidence rule's evidentiary function and its role as
a legal formality cannot be easily ignored because this was the rule's
original purpose. Early English evidence law adopted a "best evidence"
approach, "which encouraged production of only the most probative
pieces of evidence." 70 "For example, written evidence always prevailed
over oral testimony, which was distrusted due to imperfect memory
and omnipresent partiality, and, among documents, sealed records
(official memorials of the courts and legislatures) were more reliable
by law than unsealed records, and so on." 71
Sealed documents were considered the most reliable evidence,
and therefore could not be varied by a prior unsealed written agreement
or a prior oral agreement. 72 Thus, at the time there was no need for a
parol evidence rule. 73 But when the Statute of Frauds was enacted in
1677, requiring that certain categories of contracts be evidenced by
a writing signed by the defendant (even if not under seal), concern
arose that the writing requirement would be rendered meaningless
if the jury could consider extrinsic evidence. 74 Thus, it was soon held
that oral evidence could not be introduced to vary writings used to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 75 The idea that the writing was the
contract then extended from unsealed writings required under the

68
69
70
71
72

Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1692.
Id. at 1691.
Rosen, supra note 13, at 1244 n.4 73.
Id.
KEVIN

M. TE EVEN, A HISTORY
88 (1990).

OF CONTRACT

73
74
75

Id.
Id.
Id. at 88-89.

OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW
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Statute of Frauds to all writings, and by the late seventeenth century
a modem parol evidence rule took shape. 76 By the early eighteenth
century the parol evidence rule appeared in legal treatises. 77
The rationale for the rule was that the writing provided greater
certainty, 78 and the parol evidence rule was consistent with not only
a best-evidence approach, but the objective theory of contract, which
was the cornerstone of classical contract law. 79 As stated by P.S. Atiyah:
[A] reason behind the extreme objective approach is to
be found in the importance of principle. The classical
contract lawyers assumed that if it was open to a man
to deny that his apparent intent was his real intent,
many cases might occur in which the Courts would
wrongly accept such a defense. In order to exclude the
possibility of such erroneous decisions being made,
therefore, it was desirable to exclude the question
from consideration altogether. This line of reasoning
is seen perhaps most clearly in those cases in which
the Courts laid down the parol evidence rule ....
This rule ... was emphatically affirmed in a case in
1842 .... Erskine]. expressed clearly the anxiety that
opening the door to [extrinsic] evidence might simply
lead to more erroneous than correct decisions. If the
parol evidence rule were once weakened, he insisted,
'every man's will and intention, however expressed,
would be liable to be defeated, not, as now sometimes
the case, by his own defective expression of that will,
but contrary to his own plainly declared intention. 80
76
77
78
79

80

Id. at 89.
Id. at 110 n.240.
Id.
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence ofDynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L.

REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) ("[C]lassical contract law doctrines lay almost wholly
at the objective, standardized, and static poles, and also tended to be binary.
In contrast, modern contract law employs substantive rather than formal
reasoning, and pervasively (although not completely) consists of principles
that are individualized, dynamic, multi-faceted, and, in appropriate cases,
subjective.").
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 459-60
(1979) (quoting Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & F. 514, 8 E.R. 513 (1842); see also
McCormick, supra note 10, at 367 n.3 ("Coke reports Popham, C.J., as saying,
in the Countess of Rutland's case: 'Also it would be inconvenient that matters
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The rule's evidentiary function is still referenced by courts. 81
Consider the following from a Missouri appellate court:
In Missouri, we state the parol evidence rule in classical
terms. In the absence of fraud, accident, mistake, or
duress, the parol evidence rule prohibits evidence of
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which vary
or contradict the terms of an unambiguous, final and
complete writing. We justify the rule on two basic,
classical premises: (I) a written document is more
reliable and accurate than fallible human memory, and
(2) varying written terms by extrinsic oral evidence
opens the door to perjury. 82
A federal appellate court has also stated: "[T] he parol evidence rule
both 'promotes the use of, and protects, written agreements; and it
gives the trial judge a polite means of keeping suspect oral evidence from
the jury."' 83 And another court: "Underlying ... the parol evidence
rule ... is the rationale that claims based upon oral representations are
inherently unreliable." 84

81

82
83

84

in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the
certain truth of the agreement of the parties, should be controlled by averment
of the parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory."').
See Demetree v. Commonwealth Trust Co., No. Civ. A. 14354, 1996 WL 494910,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1996) ("The theoretical underpinnings of the parol
evidence rule are particularly applicable in cases such as this one where a
very long period has passed since the execution of the contract, making oral
testimony concerning expectations of the parties at the time potentially less
reliable. See 32A C.J.S., EVIDENCE§ 851, p. 216 (1964) (the parol evidence
rule is founded on the maxim that 'written evidence is so much more certain
and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be
unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to
permit weaker evidence to control').").
Jake C. Byers, Inc. v.J.B.C. Invs., 834 S.W.2d 806, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 877 F.2d 1524, 153 7 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting G. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Paro/Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 651, 654
(1979)).
Cirillo v. Slomin's Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (emphasis
added).

Daniel P. O'Gorman

326

2. Gatekeeping Function

Professor McCormick also argued that the parol evidence rule
was based on distrust of the jury. ss He asserted that the proponent
of the extrinsic agreement was often the economic underdog and
among the "have nots," and the opponent of the prior agreement
often among the "haves."s 6 He thus believed that "[t]he average
jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side
which is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by
enforcement of the writing."s 7
McCormick considered oral testimony inherently unreliable
because of the passage of time and the conscious or unconscious
bias of the party testifying about the oral agreement, and that it was
doubtful whether a jury was likely to take sufficient account of this
unreliability.ss Also, upon concluding that a prior, oral agreement
existed, it would be even more difficult for a jury to conclude that
the parties intended the integrated agreement to supersede the
prior, oral agreement. s9 The danger was heighted by the jury being
untrained, and "a body numerous enough to invite emotional organplaying by counsel." 90 McCormick argued that "[f]rom all these
sources springs grave danger that honest expectations, based upon
carefully considered written transactions, may be defeated through
the sympathetic, if not credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated
or wish-born oral agreements." 91
In contrast to juries, McCormick believed that
[t]he danger of undermining confidence in written
bargains is one which can be appreciated by a trial
judge, who looks back on many similar cases and is
trained to take a long view. Moreover, he is likely ...
to discount testimony for the warping of self-interest.
The jury, on the other hand, is likely to pass over these

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

See McCormick, supra note 10, at 366.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

366-67.
367.
368.
367.
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considerations in its urge of sympathy for a party
whom the shoe of the written contract pinches. 92
Thus, McCormick maintained "[t]hat the parol evidence rule chiefly
stems from an anxiety to protect written bargains from re-writing by
juries .... " 93 By creating a rule to be applied by the court, the court
can play a gatekeeping function, ensuring that the prior agreement
passes a court-imposed test prior to being submitted to the jury, who,
only then, would be permitted to determine whether the agreement
was actually made.
Of course, whether the prior agreement was actually made,
and, if so, whether the parties intended it to be superseded by the
integrated agreement, could itself have simply been made an issue for
the judge rather than the jury, but this was precluded by the notion
that the jury was a "symbol of political liberty." 94
Forbidden this straight path by their own
preconceptions, by a zig-zag route [the courts] came
out near the same goal. The approach was made
through doctrinal devices which gave no hint of any
departure from the usual division of functions between
judge and jury, but which were subtly convenient for
jury control in cases where written transactions were
threatened by claims of agreed oral variations not
credited by the judge. 95
In other words, a test was created where little or no fact-finding
would be performed by the court.
The gatekeeping function cannot fully explain, however, the
parol evidence rule. For example, while Professor Arthur L. Corbin

92
93
94
95

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 367-68.
at 368 n.6.
at 368-69.
at 369. McCormick argues that phrasing the question as whether the prior,
oral agreement was "collateral" to the integrated agreement provided further
facial support for the issue being for the court: "The word [collateral], through
long usage in other connections, had acquired a rich patina of technical legalism.
Consequently, it would not occur to any one to suggest the submission to a jury
of the question whether an alleged oral warranty by a landlord (at the time of
making a written lease) that the drains of the house were in good order, was
'collateral' to the lease." Id. at 371.
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acknowledged that there might be truth to McCormick's argument
when the rule is applied in jury cases, he was quick to point out that
the rule also applied in bench trials. 96 But this can be explained by a
desire to have the rule protect against the possibility that judges will
also be sympathetic to the economic underdog. In any event, "the
pervasive attitude that judges provide the best protection against
perjured testimony probably has been the reason for [the rule's]
continued viability." 97
3. Merger (or Integration) Function

A third rationale for the parol evidence rule is that "the offered
term is excluded because it has been superseded by the writing, that
is, it was not intended to survive the writing-a theory of merger
[or integration]." 98 This theory was pioneered by Professor James
Bradley Thayer in the late nineteenth century99 and later supported
by his former student John Henry Wigmore in the early twentieth
century. 100 "Viewed in this way, the rule simply affirms the primacy of
a subsequent agreement over prior negotiations and even over prior
agreements." 101 Professor Michael B. Metzger explained the merger
rationale as follows:
Under this view, the parol evidence rule is nothing
more than a particularized version of the basic

96
97

Corbin, supra note 11, at 609.
Michael B. Metzger, The Paro! Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1983).
98
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109; see also McCormick, supra note 10, at 374
(referring to the rationale as "the theory of 'integration"').
99
]AMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 409 (1898). Thayer was a professor at Harvard Law School
in the late nineteenth century, and his book A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence
at the Common Law was a meticulous historical study on the roots of evidence.
Newman, supra note 41, at 540.
100 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE c. 86 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore was a professor at
Northwestern University Law School in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and the leading evidence scholar in the first half of the twentieth
century. Newman, supra note 41, at 588. He served as the dean of the law
school for 28 years. Id.
101 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 418. See also Pierce, supra note 42, at 469 ("The
most logical rationale for the parol evidence rule is the 'merger' concept that
a subsequent integrated writing of the parties will discharge all prior oral or
written agreements.").
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contractual interpretation rule which stipulates that
later final expressions of intent prevail over earlier
tentative expressions of intent....
Under this view the primary purpose of the rule is
to prevent courts from interpreting earlier, tentative
agreements or negotiations as part of an integrated
writing that the parties actually intended as the final
expression of their agreement. Thus, according to this
view the rule's justification is based upon the finality
of the parties' written agreement. Courts exclude
oral or written terms extraneous to such a writing
not because doubt exists concerning the terms' reliability,
but rather because the terms are irrelevant, since the
parties superseded them in the final integrated writing.
This last view of the rule-the rule as insurer that
the final expression of intent governs-seems to be
currently in vogue. 102
Importantly, Professor Corbin believed the merger rationale
was the parol evidence rule's true basis:
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be
discharged or modified by subsequent agreement of
the parties. No contract whether oral or written can be
varied, contradicted, or discharged by an antecedent
agreement. Today may control the effect of what
happened yesterday; but what happened yesterday
cannot change the effect of what happens today.
This, it is believed, is the substance of what has been
unfortunately called the 'parol evidence rule.' 103
Later, Professor Farnsworth agreed that "[i]t is this purpose that the
parol evidence rule ought to serve-giving legal effect to whatever
intention the parties may have had to make their writing a complete
expression of the agreement that they reached, to the exclusion of all

102
103

Metzger, supra note 97, at 1389-90 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Corbin, supra note 11, at 607.
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prior negotiations, whether oral or written." 104 He agreed with Corbin
that the "the true basis of the parol evidence rule is something other
than a desire to keep from the jury an inherently unreliable type of
evidence. " 105
The merger rationale is supported by the fact that the parol
evidence rule applies to prior written evidence in addition to prior oral
evidence; 106 there is no special rule precluding the admissibility of an
oral modification of a written contract; 107 and the rule is considered
a rule of substantive law, not a rule of evidence. 108
If the merger theory is accepted, the parol evidence rule
analysis becomes not much different from determining whether
a subsequent oral agreement supersedes a prior oral or written
agreement. 109 There remain, however, important differences. The parol
evidence rule might still operate as an over-inclusive legal formality.
For example, the use of the contradiction and natural-inclusion tests
as a proxy for determining whether merger was intended results
in a test different from that employed when deciding whether an
oral agreement supersedes a prior written agreement, at least if an
objective natural-inclusion standard is used. Of course, if a subjective
standard is used any difference would seem to disappear, except that
the issue remains one for the court, not the jury.

104
105
106

107
108
109

FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 418.

Id. at 417.
MURRAY, supra note 37, at 418; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 416
("That the rule is not limited to oral negotiations is clear. A host of cases have
applied the so-called parol evidence rule to exclude such writings as letters,
telegrams, memoranda, and preliminary drafts exchanged by the parties before
execution of a final written agreement.").
Corbin, supra note 11, at 609.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 417.
McCormick, supra note 10, at 374. See also MURRAY, supra note 37, at 417-18
("Where the subsequent agreement is oral, the question is simply whether the
parties intended the subsequent expression to control the earlier expression
of agreement. Courts have no difficulty analyzing that question in the usual
fashion of whether the subsequent agreement was so intended by the parties.
They so do without mentioning the parol evidence rule. An oral subsequent
agreement may constitute a final and complete expression of the parties'
intended agreement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Indeed, the parties to an oral agreement
may choose their words with such explicit precision and completeness that
the same legal consequences follow as where there is a completely integrated
agreement.").
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Whether the merger theory has been widely accepted is a
matter of contention. Chancellor Murray maintained that Corbin's
view has not been accepted by the courts or the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, though it influenced the Restatement. 110 In contrast,
Farnsworth argued that while "[t]he view that the rule is evidentiary
in purpose once had currency ... [n]ow the conceit that the parol
evidence rule is rooted in the relative unreliability of testimony based
on 'slippery memory,' in contrast with the 'certain truth' afforded by
a writing, has fallen from favor."m Metzger, in the 1980s, likewise
argued that the merger theory "seems to be currently in vogue." 112
Farnsworth acknowledged, however, that the evidentiary purpose
"has not vanished entirely." 113
4. Conclusion Regarding the Rationales for the Parol
Evidence Rule

Although the merger theory appears to be in vogue, 114 the
evidentiary function and the gatekeeping function remain important
justifications for the rule. 115 First, as previously discussed, the merger
theory has not been widely accepted by the courts, and would likely
be a surprise to practicing lawyers. In fact, courts continue to explain
the rule in terms of the unreliability of parol evidence. 116 Second,
most parol evidence rule issues involve whether the prior agreement
was in fact made, not whether the parties intended the integrated
agreement to supersede an acknowledged prior agreement. 117 Third,
although aspects of the parol evidence rule weaken the evidentiary
and gatekeeping rationales, rarely are the substantive bases for rules
implemented perfectly. Also, there is no reason to believe that the rule
is not justified by multiple bases, and that some aspects of the rule
can only be explained by reference to one of the bases. Merely because
a particular aspect of the rule can only be explained by one basis
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the other bases do not
play a role with respect to other aspects of the rule. Accordingly, the

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

MURRAY,supranote37,at418.
FARNSWORTH,supranote27,at416.
Metzger, supra note 97, at 1389-90.

Id.
Id. at 1390.
See id. at 1391.
Id.
Id.
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evidentiary and gatekeeping functions should be taken into account
when applying the rule and its exceptions.
II. The Preexisting Duty Rule

The preexisting duty rule provides that the promise to
perform, or the performance of, a legal duty that is neither doubtful
nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration. 118 Thus, a
promise to perform an existing contract duty is not consideration for
a contract modification because the promisor is under a preexisting
duty to perform as promised. 119 Rather, "a modification to an existing
contract must be supported by consideration independent from that
which was given in order to form the original contract." 120
The preexisting duty rule dates to the sixteenth century
and was an outgrowth of the existing rule that a promise given in
recognition of a past benefit was not consideration. 121 For example, in
Greenleaf v. Barker a creditor promised to pay 20 shillings if the debtor
would pay the 5 pounds owed by him. 122 The King's Bench held that
the creditor's promise was unenforceable because the debtor in
exchange promised no more than the performance of his preexisting
legal duty. 123 After some subsequent cases with contrary holdings, the
preexisting duty rule was confirmed in Stilk v. Myrick in 1809, in which
a ship captain's promise to pay additional wages to sailors after two
members of the crew deserted was held unenforceable. 124
Two rationales have been provided for the preexisting duty rule.
The first is formalistic, and "a logical consequence of the doctrine of
consideration and its requirement of detriment .... " 125 Consideration
for a promise has typically been described as something that is either
118
119
120
121
122

123
124

125

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 162.
MURRAY, supra note 37, at 277.
Lokan & Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Beef Processing, LLC, 311 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2013).
TEEVEN, supra note 72, at 69.
Greenleaf v. Barker, 78 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1590), reprinted in C. FIFO OT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT
403-04 (1949).
TEEVEN, supra note 72, at 69.
170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809). For a critical commentary on how the decision in
Stilk v. Myrick became the "rule of Stilk v. Myrick," see GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 22-28 (1974).
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 162.
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a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor. 126 For
example, the classic definition of consideration was provided by the
English Exchequer Chamber in Currie v. Misa as follows: ''A valuable
consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist of either some right,
interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by
the other." 127 Under the formalistic rationale, promising to perform,
or the performance of, a preexisting duty might be a detriment to the
promisor or a benefit to the promisee, but it is not a "legal detriment"
or "legal benefit," i.e., a detriment or benefit "in the sense of the law."
The second rationale is practical: the preexisting duty rule
polices against unfair pressure. Under this theory, without the
preexisting duty rule
anyone who knows that the other party to the
contract would face economic and other difficulties
if the promisor refused to perform absent additional
consideration would be able to exact an enforceable
promise to pay additional consideration before
performing his contractual duty. The pre-existing duty
rule, therefore, provides an effective defense against
such extorted promises. 128
And "[b] ecause of the likelihood that the promise was obtained by an
express or implied threat to withhold performance of a legal duty, the
promise does not have the presumptive social utility normally found
in a bargain." 129 ''And the lack of social utility in such bargains provides
what modern justification there is for the rule that performance of a
contractual duty is not consideration for [the] new promise." 130
For example, in Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico, salmon
fishermen sued their former employer for additional wages promised
by the employer. 131 The fishermen, after arriving in Alaska, had
refused to work unless paid more wages than agreed to between the

126
127
128
129
130
131

FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 47.
[1875] LR 10 Ex. 153, 162 (Eng.).
MURRAY, supra note 37, at 277.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
Id. cmt. c.
Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 100 (9th Cir. 1902).
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parties. 132 The employer, unable to obtain replacement workers on
such short notice and in such a remote location, ultimately acceded
to the fishermen's demand and promised to pay the additional
wages. 133 After the salmon season ended, the fishermen demanded the
additional wages but the employer refused to pay. 134 The fishermen
sued, but the court, not having to address the issue of duress, held
that the promise was unenforceable because of the preexisting duty
rule: "Consent to such a demand, under such circumstances, if given,
was, in our opinion, without consideration, for the reason that it was
based solely upon the [fishermen's] agreement to render the exact
services, and none other, that they were already under contract to
render. " 135
This rationale treats the preexisting duty rule as just that, a
"rule," rather than a standard, 136 in that the rule "renders unnecessary
any inquiry into the existence of such an invalidating cause, and
denies enforcement to some promises which would otherwise be
valid." 137 Accordingly, it creates a conclusive presumption of extortion
based simply on the likelihood of extortion. The pre-existing duty
rule has therefore been criticized because it applies even when the
modification is made in good faith and not because of wrongful
pressure. 138

132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.

See MindGames, Inc. v. W. Pub!' g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (''A rule
singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive oflegal liability;
a standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant
to the standard's rationale. A speed limit is a rule; negligence is a standard.");
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1687-94 (discussing the distinction between rules
and standards).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
138 MURRAY, supra note 37, at 278-79; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at
270 ("Courts have become increasingly hostile to the pre-existing duty rule .
. . . Although it serves in some instances to give relief to a promisor that has
been subjected to overreaching, it serves in other instances to frustrate the
expectations of a promisee that has fairly negotiated a modification. It does
not, for example, distinguish between the situation in which the contractor's
demand for more money is motivated merely by opportunism and greed and the
situation in which the demand is prompted by the discovery of circumstances
or the occurrence of events that makes the contractor's performance much
more burdensome."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 cmt.
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For example, in Levine v. Blumenthal, the plaintiff leased to the
defendants premises for the operation of a retail clothing store. 139
The defendants alleged that during the lease term they informed
the plaintiff that it was impossible for them to pay the increased
rent required for the second year of the lease term because their
business was suffering, and the plaintiff agreed to not increase it until
their business improved. 140 When the lease term expired without
the defendants exercising an option to renew, the plaintiff sued the
defendants for the additional rent that had not been paid. 141 The court
held that the plaintiff's promise to accept reduced rent, even if made,
was unenforceable because it lacked consideration:
It is elementary that the subsequent agreement, to
impose the obligation of a contract, must rest upon a
new and independent consideration .... The principle
is firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence that a promise
to do what the promisor is already legally bound to do
is an unreal consideration. It has been criticized, at
least in some of its special applications, as 'mediaeval'
and wholly artificial-one that operates to defeat
the 'reasonable bargains of business men.' But these
strictures are not well grounded. They reject the basic
principle that a consideration, to support a contract,
consists either of a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee-a doctrine that has always
been fundamental in our conception of consideration.
It is a principle, almost universally accepted, that an
act or forebearance required by a legal duty owing to
the promisor that is neither doubtful nor the subject
of honest and reasonable dispute is not a sufficient
consideration ....

c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[T]he rule has not been limited to cases where
there was a possibility of unfair pressure, and it has [therefore] been much
criticized as resting on scholastic logic.").
139 Levine v. Blumenthal, 186 A. 457, 457 (N.J. 1936), aff'd, 189 A. 54 (N.J. Ct.
Err. &App. 1937).
140 Id. at 457.
141 Jd.at457-58.
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So tested, the secondary agreement at issue is not
supported by a valid consideration; and it therefore
created no legal obligation. General economic
adversity, however disastrous it may be in its individual
consequences, is never a warrant for judicial abrogation
of this primary principle of the law of contracts. 142
Thus, the absence of wrongful pressure was irrelevant; the lack of
new consideration meant the modification was not binding.
As a result of criticism, the preexisting duty rule has been
subject to a variety of exceptions. For example, under Article 2 of the
U. C. C. a modification involving a transaction in goods does not require
consideration to be enforceable. 143 Rather, the modification need only
meet the test of good faith. 144 Thus, the question of extortion is
addressed directly, rather than through a prophylactic rule such as the
preexisting duty rule. Also, the preexisting duty rule does not apply
if the legal duty is either doubtful or the subject of honest dispute. 145
Further, if the asserted preexisting duty is voidable or unenforceable
the person is not considered under a duty to perform. 146 Thus, if
the parties enter into a voidable contract, a subsequent modification
that is favorable to just one party, and that is not voidable, is binding
despite the preexisting duty rule. 147 Similarly, if an oral agreement
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, a subsequent written
modification that is favorable to just one party is binding despite the
preexisting duty rule. Detrimental reliance on a modification that
lacks consideration could also make the modification binding under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 148 Further, under the so-called
unanticipated-circumstances doctrine, "[a] promise modifying a duty
under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding ... if
the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made .... " 149

142 Id. at 458-59.
143 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
144 Id. cmt. 2.
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
146 Id. cmt. e.
147 Id.cmt.e,illus.13.
148 Seeid.§90(1).
149 Id. § 89. If the court in Levine v. Blumenthal, 186 A. 457, 457 (NJ. 1936),
aff'd, 189 A. 54 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1937), had applied the unanticipatedcircumstances doctrine, the outcome would likely have been different.
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Ill. The Clash of Titans: The Parol Evidence Rule vs. the
Preexisting Duty Rule

There are two different fact patterns in which a parol evidence
rule issue arises. The first is when the parties' only manifestation of
assent to an agreement is upon assent to the integrated agreement.
For example, the parties might agree at the outset of negotiations that
a binding agreement will not exist unless and until their agreement
is reduced to a written document signed by both parties. In such a
situation, only the parol evidence rule is implicated. The preexisting
duty rule is not implicated because, lacking a prior agreement, there
was no preexisting duty at the time the parties manifested assent
to the integrated agreement (at least not stemming from a prior
agreement).
The second is when the parties manifest assent to a binding
agreement (oral or written) and thereafter confirm the agreement
in an integrated agreement, but the integrated agreement is not
accurate in all respects. In this situation, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts treats the confirmation as an offer of substituted terms and
the offeree's manifestation of assent to the written confirmation as
an acceptance of those terms. 150 In this situation, not only is the
parol evidence rule implicated, but the preexisting duty rule as well,
provided that one of the parties alleges that the integrated agreement
did not include any new consideration.
A difficulty is distinguishing between these two situations,
particularly when the alleged prior agreement is oral. Often, it will be
unclear whether preliminary, oral negotiations rose to the level of an
oral contract, or whether the first manifestation of assent was when
the agreement was reduced to written form. The difficulty might
arise either from conflicting testimony or from determining, even if
the facts are undisputed, when the parties' negotiations rose from
preliminary negotiations to an oral contract.
In general, it will not be difficult for a party to assert facts that,
if believed, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that an oral
agreement was formed prior to the integrated agreement. And because
the parol evidence rule only applies if the integrated agreement is
binding, 151 and thus does not prevent the use of extrinsic evidence
150

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

151

1981).
Id.§§ 213(1)-(2).
INST.

209 cmt. b, illus. 2
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Daniel P. O'Gorman

338

to establish that the integrated agreement lacks consideration, the
parol evidence rule would not apply when the integrated agreement
is alleged to be a one-sided modification of a prior oral agreement.
In other words, the consideration exception provides that, in general,
the preexisting duty rule prevails over the parol evidence rule in this
clash of titans.
Accordingly, if a plaintiff sues for the breach of a promise that
was not included in an integrated agreement to which the parties
subsequently manifested assent, the parol evidence rule would not
apply if the plaintiff alleges that the parties formed an enforceable oral
contract prior to the integrated agreement and that the only difference
between the two is the omission from the integrated agreement of
the promise sued upon. Because the court, when applying the parol
evidence rule, must assume the existence of the prior promise or
agreement, the court cannot apply the parol evidence rule since, as
a result of the assumption, the integrated agreement is considered
non-binding under the preexisting duty rule. The proponent of the
extrinsic agreement avoids application of the contradiction test and
the natural-inclusion test and the agreement's existence is submitted
to the fact-finder for determination. Of course, "slight variations of
circumstance are commonly held to take a case out of the [preexisting
duty] rule," 152 but the new performance must in fact be bargained
for. 153 Thus, at least in the case of a prior oral agreement, the defendant
could argue that it manifested assent to the integrated agreement in
exchange for the modification (an exchange of written evidence of
the deal for the modification), but evidence of an actual bargain of
this nature would be necessary.
The Restatement (First) of Contracts provided the following
illustration of the consideration exception to the parol evidence rule
based on the preexisting duty rule:
A and B make an integrated agreement by which A
promises to complete an unfinished building according
to certain plans and specifications, and B promises to
pay A $2000 for so doing. It may be shown that by
a contract made previously A had promised to erect
and complete the building for $10,000; that he had
not fully completed it though paid the whole price.
152
153

Id.§ 73 cmt. c.
Id. cmt. a.
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This evidence is admissible because it establishes
that there is not sufficient consideration for the new
agreement, since A is promising no more than he is
bound by his original contract to perform. 154
This illustration was used as support in Guaranty Trust Co. of
N. Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co. 155 In Williamsport Wire the trustees
of a corporation in receivership (Lycoming Trust Co.) sold what they
believed were the corporation's only remaining assets for $30 at an
auction on September 17, 1952. 156 Around ten days later the trustees
signed a general assignment in the buyer's favor covering all the
corporation's remaining claims. 157
Six years earlier, stockholders, former stockholders, and
former bondholders of the Williamsport Wire Rope Co. had sued
to set aside the sale of Williamsport's assets to Bethlehem Steel
Co. 158 In January 1952 a special master had recommended that the
sale be set aside and that Bethlehem restore to former stockholders
whatever stock had been sold to Bethlehem after July 1936. 159 In
December 1936 Lycoming had sold shares it owned in Williamsport
Wire Rope Co. to Bethlehem, and when the court adopted the special
master's report on October 14, 1952, Bethlehem paid $6 million
for distribution to the former Williamsport stockholders (including
Lycoming). 160 Thus, Lycoming's assets became unexpectedly greater
than either the liquidating trustees or the buyer had believed at the
time of the auction and the general assignment. 161
The trustees and the buyer made conflicting claims to $3 00, 000
of the total amount deposited by Bethlehem for former stockholders. 162
The special master admitted over objection parol evidence to show
that the general assignment was not intended to include the claim

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 238 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1932).
222 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1955).
Id. at 418.

Id.
Id.at417.
Id. at 419; Guar. Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 107 F. Supp.
759, 760 (M.D. Pa.), vacated, 107 F. Supp. 762 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
Williamsport Wire, 222 F.2d at 419.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419.
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against Bethlehem. 163 The special master recommended that the
trustees prevail, and the district court ruled in their favor. 164
On appeal, the issue was whether it was error to admit
such parol evidence. 165 The court held that the parol evidence
was admissible, among other reasons, to show that if the written
assignment purported to assign more than had been previously
agreed upon, the written assignment lacked consideration:
Parol evidence is also admissible to establish the
failure of consideration. Restatement, Contracts, Sec.
238, Illustration 2 (1938). Here the appellant had
already agreed to pay $30 for the assignment and
transfer of the items on the list in the sheriff's office.
The sale was completed on September 17, 1952.
'A sale by auction is complete when the

auctioneer announces its completion by the
fall of the hammer, or in other customary
manner.' Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 69, § 161 (1931).
Only afterward, possibly more than ten days afterward,
was the idea of a general assignment put forth by
appellant as something it wanted in addition to the
rubber stamp endorsements. Since $30 constituted the
consideration only for the items on the list referred to
in the advertisement, the general assignment, if it did
attempt to give appellant more than what was on the list,
was without consideration and must accordingly fall. 166
Thereafter, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, published
in 1981, included three illustrations involving the parol evidence
rule and the preexisting duty rule. The first is notable because it
involved a prior oral agreement that was not discharged because
the subsequent integrated agreement was a modification without
consideration, showing that the consideration exception applies even

163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420-21.
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when the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function is implicated. 167
The second illustration involved an integrated modification induced
by an agreement not incorporated into the integration, showing
that if the parol evidence rule discharges the inducing agreement
thereby causing the modification to be a non-binding modification
due to lack of consideration (the new consideration having been the
inducing agreement), the integration is non-binding even though the
prior agreement would have been part of the integrated agreement
(thereby supplying consideration) had it not been discharged by
the parol evidence rule. 168 The third illustration was based on the
Restatement (First)'s illustration. 169 The comment also stated that
"[t]he circumstance may ... show an agreement to discharge a prior
agreement without regard to whether the integrated agreement is
binding, and such an agreement may be effective." 170
A recent example of a court relying on the Restatement
(Second) and using the consideration exception to circumvent the
parol evidence rule is Audubon Indemnity Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc. 171
In Audubon the issue was whether an indemnification agreement in
a written subcontract agreement, under which the subcontractor
promised to indemnify the general contractor, was binding. 172 One
of the subcontractor's defenses to the indemnification agreement was
that it lacked consideration. 173 Consistent with their past practices,
the subcontractor and the general contractor had operated on the
project pursuant to an oral agreement and did not have a written
contract until after the subcontractor performed the work on the

167
168

169
170
171
172
173

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213 cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
Id. cmt. d, illus. 6. The illustration was in support of the following statements
in the comment: "[A]n integrated agreement may be effective to render
inoperative an oral term which would have been part of the agreement if
it had not been integrated. The integrated agreement may then be without
consideration, even though the inoperative term would have furnished
consideration." Id. cmt. d.
Id. § 214 cmt. c, illus. 5. See also id. § 214 cmt. c, reporter's note ("Illustrations
5 and 6 are based on Illustrations 2 and 3 to former§ 238.").
Id.§ 213 cmt. d.
358 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
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project. 174 The general contractor and the subcontractor had not
discussed indemnification at the time of the oral contract. 175
After the work was completed, the subcontractor sent an
invoice to the general contractor and the general contractor cut a
check for the amount invoiced. 176 But before tendering the check, the
general contractor signed and sent a written "subcontract agreement"
to the subcontractor under which the subcontractor promised to
perform the work (already performed), and also promised to indemnify
the general contractor for any claims based on the subcontractor's
work. 177 The written agreement included a merger clause. 178 The
parties testified that the general contractor typically required the
subcontractor to sign a written, form subcontract agreement before
the general contractor paid for the work and that they were typically
signed after the work was completed. 179 The subcontractor signed
the written agreement. 180
Thereafter, the project owner sued the general contractor
based on the subcontractor's negligence, and the trial court ordered
the dispute to arbitration. 181 The arbitrator found in favor of the
owner, and the general contractor's insurance carrier paid the award. 182
The insurance carrier then sued the subcontractor for contractual
indemnity under the subcontract agreement's indemnification
provision. 183
The subcontractor argued that the indemnification agreement
was unenforceable because it lacked consideration, the subcontractor
having fully performed at the time it was signed and the parties never
having discussed indemnification at the time of the oral contract. 184
In response, the insurance carrier argued that the subcontractor's
lack of consideration defense was barred by the parol evidence
rule. 185 If the parol evidence rule applied, the insurance carrier would
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178
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 315, 318.
Id. at 315.
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prevail because a lack of an indemnification agreement in the oral
agreement would obviously conflict with the integrated agreement's
indemnification provision. 186 The insurance carrier also argued that
signing an indemnification agreement was an implied term of the
oral contract. 187
The appellate court rejected the insurance carrier's parol
evidence rule argument, holding that a court may consider parol
evidence to show a lack of consideration, citing to, among other
authority, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 188 The court also
held that parol evidence was admissible to determine whether the
integrated agreement was the only agreement (simply memorializing
the prior oral agreement) or whether it was a modification of a prior
oral contract thereby needing independent consideration. 189 The court
stated that "[i] f the terms of a subsequent written contract differ
from what the parties intended in their original oral agreement-Le.,
if the written contract modified the agreed upon terms-the written
contract requires new consideration." 190
Thus, as shown by Williamsport Wire and Audubon Indemnity,
the parol evidence rule can be circumvented by an allegation that the
integrated agreement was a one-sided modification of a prior oral
contract. Having made such an allegation, the consideration exception
applies, and the issue proceeds past the parol evidence rule and goes
directly to the fact-finder to determine whether the prior oral contract
was made and, if so, its scope. If the fact-finder concludes that the
prior contract existed and that the integrated agreement was a onesided modification, the integrated agreement is unenforceable under
the preexisting duty rule.
It bears noting, however, that the consideration exception is
inapplicable in a variety of situations. For example, if the agreement
is considered a transaction in goods, 191 the preexisting duty rule and
the consideration exception could not be used to circumvent the
parol evidence rule because under the U.C.C. consideration is not
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the
extent that it is inconsistent with them.").
Audubon, 358 S.W. 3d at 316.

Id.
Id. at 316-17.
Id.
See U.C.C. § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies
to transactions in goods ....") (AM. LAW INST. & UN!F. LAW COMM'N 2012).
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necessary for a contract modification. 192 Thus, because the U.C.C.
retains the parol evidence rule, 193 yet discards the preexisting duty
rule (at least with respect to contract modifications), 194 when the
agreement is a transaction in goods the parol evidence rule trumps
the preexisting duty rule.
Also, as previously discussed, if the prior agreement is
voidable or unenforceable, the preexisting duty rule does not apply
and the parol evidence rule trumps the preexisting duty rule. Thus,
if the party who would ordinarily invoke the consideration exception
happened to have contracted with a party who had the power to void
the original contract (say, due to infancy), that party could no longer
invoke the exception. The consideration exception would also not
apply to oral agreements within the Statute of Frauds. For example,
assume that in the well-known case of Mitchill v. Lath the buyer and
seller had formed an oral contract for the sale of the parcel of land
and the removal of the offensive icehouse before assenting to the
integrated agreement. 195 This oral agreement would be unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds' land-contract provision. 196 Even if the
subsequent integrated agreement omitted the promise to remove
the icehouse, with all other consideration remaining the same,
the integrated agreement would be binding because the prior oral
agreement was unenforceable. Thus, the consideration exception to
the parol evidence rule would not apply.
While such results have the effect of reinforcing the parol
evidence rule by narrowing the consideration exception, there is no
logical connection between the cases in which it is narrowed and the
rule's purposes. Using the consideration exception for cases involving
the preexisting duty rule (as opposed to say, showing that the recited
consideration is a sham) results in a hodgepodge of disparate results
driven by the finer points of the preexisting duty rule, rather than
by the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping purposes.
Interestingly, however, most courts and attorneys are likely
unaware of this parol evidence rule loophole. For example, in Petereit
v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., the plaintiffs, who were distributors, sued the
defendant manufacturer for breach of an oral contract under which

192
193
194
195
196

Id.§ 2-209(1).
Id. § 2-202.
Id.§ 2-209(1).
Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646 (N.Y. 1928).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 125(1)

(AM. LAW INST.
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the defendant promised not to realign the plaintiffs' sales territories. 197
The district court, acting as fact-finder, found that the parties
had formed an oral contract when, at a meeting, the defendant's
representative laid out the terms of the proposed business relationship
and the distributors then began delivering products within days of the
meeting (and in some instances even before) .198 Consistent with the
defendant's business practice, it sent letters to some of the plaintiffs
shortly after the meeting or the commencement of the distributorship
to confirm the terms previously agreed upon. 199 The letters, contrary
to the oral agreement, noted that the distributor's territory was not
permanently assigned. 200 The letters requested the distributor to
contact the defendant if there were any questions or if the letter was
unclear. 201
On appeal, one of the issues was whether, under the parol
evidence rule, the written confirmations were an integrated agreement
that discharged the defendant's prior promise in the oral contract
that it would not realign the plaintiffs' territories. 202 The appellate
court acknowledged that "[s] ome, if not all, plaintiffs began their
business relationship with defendant at a meeting with a [defendant]
representative." 203 The court noted that at a typical meeting the
defendant made an offer, and "[i] f the distributor accepted, nothing
else needed to be done to have an enforceable contract." 204 Because
the oral contracts were of an indefinite duration, the Statute of Frauds
did not render them unenforceable under the Statute's one-year
provision. 205 The court, however, held that the written confirmations,
sent within a few days of the meeting or the effective date of the
distributorship, were integrated agreements to which the plaintiffs
manifested assent by not questioning the terms and by performing
thereafter for many years. 206 As integrated agreements, the letters
therefore discharged any prior inconsistent terms in the oral contract,
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199
200
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Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.atll73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1176-78.
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thereby discharging the prior promise that the sales territories would
not be altered. 207
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the parol
evidence rule's evidentiary function, repeatedly referring to the
preference for written agreements over prior oral agreements
when discussing the rule. For example, the court stated that
"[i]t is a cornerstone of contract law that written agreements hold
a special place in the eyes of the law" and that evidence of a prior
"unwritten" agreement should not have any effect on an integrated
agreement. 208 The court noted that "to permit oral testimony, or prior
or contemporaneous conversations, or circumstances, or usages
[etc.], in order to ... contradict what is written would be dangerous
and unjust in the extreme." 209 The court stated that permitting oral
testimony in this case to contradict the written confirmations could
lead to injustice:
Were we to hold otherwise, the recipient of a writing
confirming the terms of a contemporaneous oral
agreement could escape an unfavorable written
provision that the recipient believes differs from the
oral understanding simply by silence. The recipient
could perform under the agreement and years later
renounce the written terms of the contract to the
surprise of the offeror. Such a rule would nullify the
benefits of reducing an agreement to written form, and
is one we decline to make. 210
The court, however, never considered the parol evidence
rule's consideration exception, and whether the written confirmation,
although an integrated agreement to which the parties manifested
assent, was not "binding" under the preexisting duty rule. This
is particularly surprising because the court treated the written
confirmation as an offer and acceptance of substituted terms:

207 Id. at 1179.
208 Id. at 1177.
209 Id. (quoting TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 589 A.2d 329, 333 (Conn.
1991) (quoting in turn Glendale Woolen Co. v. The Protection Ins. Co., 21
Conn. 19, 37 (1851) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)).
210 Id. at 1178.
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The logical outcome of the [parol evidence] rule is
that when there is an oral agreement that one party
reduces to a writing, the other party's assent to the
writing, by words or conduct, even though a term of
the writing differs from the oral understanding, is an
acceptance of the substituted term ....
To the extent the writing differed from any oral
understanding of the parties, it was a substitution of
new terms. 211
And although there was a dissenting opinion, it was based solely
on the belief that the district court had made a factual finding
that the plaintiffs had not manifested assent to the confirmation
letters, not that the letters-even if integrated agreements-lacked
consideration. 212
IV. Closing the Loophole

When the parties manifest assent to an integrated agreement,
and one of the parties disputes the existence or terms of the alleged
prior agreement, permitting the proponent of the prior agreement
to invoke the consideration exception based on the preexisting
duty rule is a parol evidence rule loophole. 213 In such a situation,
the consideration exception can be used as a means of escaping the
parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. To avoid
frustrating these purposes, the loophole should be closed.
Of course, applying the consideration exception in such a
situation is consistent with the parol evidence rule's merger function.
If the parol evidence rule were based solely on whether the parties

211

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209 cmt. b, illus. 2

(AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
212 Id. at 1187-88 (Kearse, J., dissenting). The court did not discuss whether the
contract was governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. If the U.C.C. governed, then
the consideration exception would not apply because the U.C.C. does not
require consideration for an effective modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
213 A loophole has been defined as "a means of escape; esp: an ambiguity or omission
in the text through which the intent of a statute, contract, or obligation may
be evaded." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 734 (11th ed.
2003).
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intended the integrated agreement to supersede the prior agreement,
such an intention is irrelevant if the integrated agreement is not
binding under the preexisting duty rule. The preexisting duty rule is
designed to prevent an agreement from being binding even when the
parties intended it to supersede a prior agreement. Thus, under the
merger rationale the preexisting duty rule would, and should, trump
the parol evidence rule. The merger theorists would have no cause
to complain, except to the extent they disliked the preexisting duty
rule, another matter entirely.
But the use of the consideration exception in a situation
involving the preexisting duty rule is inconsistent with the parol
evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. Under the
evidentiary theory, the parol evidence rule is not designed to only
protect against the enforcement of preliminary agreements that the
parties intended to be superseded by the integrated agreement; it is
designed to police against fraudulent and mistaken claims of a prior
agreement. By failing to apply the parol evidence rule's consistency test
and natural-inclusion test in these situations, the rule's evidentiary
function of form is lost. Similarly, the rule's gatekeeping function is
lost, submitting the issue directly to the jury.
As discussed in Part I, the evidentiary and gatekeeping
functions remain important justifications for the parol evidence rule.
Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure that these functions are not
frustrated by the use of the consideration exception in this fashion. At
the same time, however, it is necessary to ensure that the preexisting
duty rule's purpose of policing against extorted modifications will
not be frustrated. Essentially, there is a conflict between two overinclusive rules, each of which should be accommodated to avoid
frustrating their purposes. The question, of course, is how best to
accommodate their competing purposes when the rules clash.
A possible solution would be to simply reject the consideration
exception for situations involving the preexisting duty rule, and
to therefore apply the parol evidence rule. If the prior agreement
contradicts the integrated agreement or it would have been natural
to include the alleged prior term within the integrated agreement, it
is discharged, even if the integrated agreement is not supported by
consideration under the preexisting duty rule. This would fully protect
the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions.
It would do so, however, at the expense of the preexisting
duty rule's policing function. In many cases there will be no dispute
that a prior agreement was formed, and the only issue is whether the
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integrated agreement was intended to supersede terms in the prior
agreement that were not incorporated into the integrated agreement.
In such a situation, the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function
plays a more limited role, and the merger function is more strongly
implicated. As previously discussed, even when the merger function
is implicated, the parol evidence rule being cast as a legal formality
still results in an over-inclusive test to determine intent to merge.
Thus, simply because the merger function is more strongly implicated
than the evidentiary function does not mean that the parol evidence
rule is simply relegated to directly determining the parties' intentions.
But when the rule's merger function is more strongly
implicated than its evidentiary function, the preexisting duty rule's
countervailing extortion-policing function should be accounted for,
because the merger function is in fact designed to implement the
parties' intentions, even if in an over-inclusive way. And as previously
discussed, the preexisting duty rule is designed to render an agreement
unenforceable despite the parties' intentions that it be enforceable. 214
Accordingly, simply rejecting the consideration exception in cases
involving the preexisting duty rule should be rejected.
This discussion, however, points the way to a solution. The
solution is to be found in identifying the nature of the parol evidence
rule dispute in a particular case: Are the parties disputing the existence
of the prior agreement or its terms, or are they simply disputing
whether the parties intended the prior agreement to be superseded
by the integrated agreement? In other words, is the parol evidence
rule's evidentiary function implicated or its merger function?
If there is a dispute about the existence of the prior agreement
or its terms, a possible accommodation could be to require the plaintiff
to prove the prior agreement by clear and convincing evidence, rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence. 215 As noted by Professor Eric
Posner, "courts sometimes impose higher evidentiary requirements
... in order to maintain the spirt of the [parol evidence] rule." 216 For

214
215

See infra Part II.
See Parker v. Parker, 238 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 1968) ("To verbalize the distinction

216

between the differing degrees more precisely, proof by a 'preponderance of
the evidence' means that a jury must believe that the facts asserted by the
proponent are more probably true than false; proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
means the facts asserted by the prosecution are almost certainly true; and proof
by 'clear and convincing evidence' means that the jury must believe that the
truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly probable.").
POSNER, supra note 61, at 149.
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example, a party seeking to reform an integrated agreement because
of a mistake in integration must establish the mistake by clearand-convincing evidence so as not to frustrate the parol evidence
rule's purpose. 217 Similarly, for the Statute of Frauds' multipledocuments exception to apply in the absence of explicit incorporation
by reference, evidence of the connection between the documents
must be clear and convincing. 218 Courts have also held that a party
who relies on a lost document to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must
prove the document's contents by clear-and-convincing evidence. 219
And a similar recommendation for the parol evidence rule itself was
proposed by Dean W. G. Hale, who argued that the rule should create
a rebuttable presumption that an integrated agreement is complete,
which could only be overcome by clear-and-convincing evidence. 220
But under such a solution the fact-finder would likely need to
be the jury. As previously discussed, to maintain the legitimacy of the
parol evidence rule as an issue of law for the court, the court should
not make factual findings. And if the jury, rather than the court, is
the fact-finder, the parol evidence rule's gatekeeping function will
be frustrated.
A solution that would preserve the parol evidence rule's
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions would be to have the parol
evidence rule apply when the evidentiary function is implicated
but not when the merger function is implicated. A party, however,
should not be permitted to invoke the parol evidence rule by simply
denying the existence of the prior agreement. Rather, some minimal
showing should be necessary to ensure that the parol evidence rule's
evidentiary function is truly implicated. As previously discussed,
the court should (for the most part) not act as the fact-finder when
resolving a parol evidence rule issue. Accordingly, the required
showing by the defendant should not involve the court weighing the
evidence and acting as a finder of fact.
The solution is to invoke the summary-judgment standard
and determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of material

217

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
218 Id.§ 132 cmt. a.
219 See, e.g., Weinsier v. Soffer, 358 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that proof of the contents of a lost document must be "clear, strong and
unequivocal").
220 W. G. Hale, TheParolEvidenceRule, 4 OR. L. REV. 91, 122 (1925).
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fact. 221 The parol evidence rule's evidentiary function would thus
only be implicated if the party seeking to invoke the parol evidence
rule introduces sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable fact-finder
to conclude that the prior agreement, as alleged by the opposing
party, did not exist. Because the parol evidence rule is considered a
substantive rule, and not a rule of evidence, 222 the court would apply
the summary-judgment standard of the state whose law governs the
dispute. 223 The burden of establishing that there is a genuine dispute
regarding the prior agreement's existence should be placed on the
party invoking the parol evidence rule because it is seeking to displace
the consideration exception.
If the party invoking the parol evidence rule introduces
admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute regarding whether the
alleged prior agreement existed or regarding its terms, a presumption
should arise that the parol evidence rule will apply, so that the rule's
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions are preserved. If, however,
the party invoking the rule does not create a genuine dispute, and
only the merger function of the parol evidence rule is implicated,
the consideration exception should apply (because the issue of
intent to supersede does not trump the preexisting duty rule) and
the undisputed prior agreement would be admissible to render the
integrated agreement unenforceable under the preexisting duty rule.
But having the accommodation hinge solely on whether
there is a genuine dispute of fact regarding the existence of the prior
agreement might undercut the preexisting duty rule's function of
policing for extortion. For example, the parol evidence rule might
discharge a prior agreement and thus enforce the subsequent
integrated agreement even though the subsequent agreement might
have been a modification without consideration, which ordinarily
raises the suspicion of extortion. Accordingly, further refinement

221

222
223

See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
State summary-judgment standards often differ from the federal standard.
See JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,
and Democratic Values, 3 7 AKRON L. REV. 717, 769 (2004) (discussing the
differences).
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is necessary to not sacrifice the preexisting duty rule's extortionpolicing function.
The appropriate refinement is to provide the proponent of the
prior agreement with the opportunity to create a genuine dispute as
to whether she manifested assent to the integrated agreement as a
result of the other party's wrongful refusal to perform the alleged
prior agreement. If the proponent carries this burden, then the parol
evidence rule would not apply and the fact-finder would decide
whether the prior agreement existed, what its terms were (so as to
determine if there was consideration for the integrated agreement),
and whether the parties intended the subsequent integrated agreement
to supersede the prior agreement. This refinement accommodates the
preexisting duty rule's extortion-policing function.
To show how this proposed solution works, we will return to
the hypothetical involving the building and painting of the toolshed
discussed in the Introduction. 224 The plaintiff sues a defendant for
breach of the alleged prior agreement to paint the toolshed, a promise
that was not incorporated into the integrated agreement, which only
included a promise to build the toolshed. In response, the defendant
argues that the prior agreement was discharged under the parol
evidence rule because it would have been natural to include such a
promise in the integrated agreement. In reply, the plaintiff alleges
that the parties formed an oral agreement prior to the integrated
agreement, and that the only difference between the alleged prior
agreement and the integrated agreement is that the defendant's
promise to paint the toolshed was not included in the integrated
agreement. The plaintiff argues that the integrated agreement was
therefore an attempted modification that lacked consideration under
the preexisting duty rule and is thus not binding.
Under existing law, because the court must assume the
existence of the prior agreement as alleged by the plaintiff, and
because of the consideration exception, the parol evidence rule
would not apply (no "binding" integrated agreement) and the issue
of the agreement's existence and its terms would be submitted to
the fact-finder for determination. Although the fact-finder might
conclude, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the
prior agreement was not formed, or, if formed, that the integrated
agreement included modifications favorable to both parties and was

224

See infra Introduction.
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intended to supersede the prior agreement (leading to a conclusion
that the integrated agreement is a binding modification), the benefits
of the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions
are frustrated.
Under this Article's proposed approach, if the defendant
introduced admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact
as to whether the prior agreement existed as alleged-such as by
submitting an affidavit denying the alleged promise or so testifying
in court-a presumption would arise that the parol evidence rule
will apply, so that its evidentiary and gatekeeping functions are not
frustrated. For example, the defendant might testify that he never
promised the plaintiff that he would paint the toolshed. The plaintiff
would then be given an opportunity to introduce admissible evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant
threatened not to perform the original agreement unless the plaintiff
agreed to the modification. If the plaintiff does so, then the parol
evidence rule would not apply. For example, the plaintiff might testify
that the defendant threatened to not build the toolshed unless she
signed the integrated agreement.
Adopting this Article's solution would not threaten the parol
evidence rule's general exception for admitting extrinsic evidence to
support invalidating causes, such as illegality, fraud, duress, mistake,
or sham consideration. 225 An integrated agreement is not designed
to render evidence of such invalidating causes inadmissible, whereas
the very purpose of an integrated agreement is to render inadmissible
evidence of a prior agreement. Thus, the proposed solution is
appropriately limited to the situation involving the consideration
exception and the preexisting duty rule.
Let us now return to the facts of Williamsport Wire, Audubon
Indemnity, and Petereit to analyze how the analysis would proceed
under the facts of those cases. In Williamsport Wire there was no
genuine dispute as to the scope of the parties' prior agreement; it
was undisputed that the prior agreement did not include a claim for
stock sold to Bethlehem. 226 Accordingly, the parol evidence rule's
evidentiary function was not implicated, and it would be appropriate
to apply the consideration exception and to admit the prior agreement.

225
226

214(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 222 F.2d 416, 419-20
(3d Cir. 1955).
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In Audubon Indemnity, however, there was a genuine dispute as
to whether the parties had agreed, even if impliedly, as part of their
oral agreement as to whether an indemnification agreement would
be part of the deal. Accordingly, the insurance carrier would be able
to create a genuine dispute regarding the terms of the prior oral
agreement. Thus, a presumption would arise that the parol evidence
rule applies. The subcontractor did not argue that it manifested
assent to the integrated agreement as a result of wrongful pressure.
Although the parties agreed that the general contractor typically
required the subcontractor to sign a written agreement before being
paid, 227 there was no allegation that the general contractor pressured
the subcontractor to sign the written agreement, the subcontractor
alleging that the general contractor told the subcontractor that it (the
general contractor) needed a written document in its file relating to
payment. 228 Accordingly, the parol evidence rule should have applied.
In Petereit, the defendant maintained that no specific
territories had been assigned to distributors on a permanent basis. 229
Accordingly, there existed a genuine dispute as to whether there was
an oral agreement for permanent territories, and the plaintiffs did not
allege that they assented to the written confirmations as a result of
a threat by the defendant to not perform the existing oral contract.
Thus, the court was correct to apply the parol evidence rule.
V. Conclusion

Applying the parol evidence rule's consideration exception
to a situation in which the proponent of extrinsic evidence alleges
that an integrated agreement is not binding because it modifies a
prior agreement and lacks consideration under the preexisting duty
rule threatens the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping
functions. It is therefore a parol evidence rule loophole, and an
accommodation between the parol evidence rule and the preexisting
duty rule is necessary. The appropriate accommodation is to apply the
parol evidence rule if the party seeking to invoke the rule creates a
genuine dispute as to whether the prior agreement existed, unless the
proponent of the extrinsic evidence creates a genuine dispute as to

227 Audubon Indem. Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2011).
228 Id.
229 Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1177 (2d Cir. 1995).
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whether she manifested assent to the integrated agreement because
the other party wrongfully threated to breach the prior contract. Such
an approach accommodates the parol evidence rule's evidentiary
and gatekeeping functions and the preexisting duty rule's extortionpolicing function.

